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4ABSTRACT
This report has been developed in compliance with the requirements for conducting a 
study on Impact of the Economic Crisis on the National System of Industrial Relations 
in Bulgaria: Policies as a Key Instrument for Recovery. Its aim is to present the impact 
of the crisis and the impact of austerity measures in particular on the industrial relations 
in Bulgaria by outlining the key challenges facing the national system of industrial 
relations. It also outlines the political response of the main players in  industrial relations 
and proposes some recommendations for a more effi cient social dialogue for recovery 
from the crisis. 
After the beginning of the democratic changes in CEE countries in 1989 trade unions 
were among the fi rst civil society organizations to change most dynamically and in many 
countries were the main driving force behind the process of transformation. In Bulgaria 
this process was very strong. Establishing trade union pluralism in Bulgaria contributed 
in reality to the trade unions’ turning into key actors in the process of reforms, especially 
during the years of preparation and introduction of the new system of industrial relations. 
The policy of supporting reforms at an acceptable social cost and of establishing a 
new consensual culture of labour relations through social dialogue also added to their 
reputation, and allowed them to take the lead in constituting the new system of industrial 
relations and social partnership.
At national level the institutional and legislative framework of industrial relations has 
been set up and social dialogue is developing regardless of some diffi culties and 
obstacles in certain periods. Besides, the crisis has put to the test the already established 
mechanisms and even the very spirit of social partnership at different levels. This report 
presents the emerging and development trends of the national system of industrial 
relations in Bulgaria and outlines their dynamics in times of crisis.
The focus is on:
 Legislative and institutional framework of industrial relations at different 
levels
 Key actors in the national system of industrial relations
 Mechanisms and forms of social dialogue and collective bargaining at 
different levels as a response to the challenges of the crisis
 Recommendations on building an effective system of social dialogue to 
recover from the crisis
In view of this, the structure of the report is as follows:
Chapter one reviews the main parameters of the framework of the national system 
of industrial relations in Bulgaria, including the legislative and political framework of 
industrial relations. It briefl y describes the historical prerequisites, legacy and trends 
5which determine today’s development of the organizations of the social partners and the 
state of industrial relations in Bulgaria. It touches upon issues related to the main players 
in industrial relations, institutions, mechanisms and procedures of social dialogue, as 
well as the system of collective bargaining.
Chapter two focuses on the crisis and the challenges facing  social dialogue, in particular 
– on the dynamics of the economy, employment and development of social dialogue at 
different levels of the country’s system of industrial relations. 
Chapter three considers the impact of social dialogue and political response, including 
changes in legislation, fi scal instruments, changes in collective bargaining and fl exibility 
of payment. Special attention has been given to social dialogue and political decisions on 
reforming education, pension and health systems in times of crisis. 
At the end, there are conclusions and recommendations on future development for 
increasing the effi ciency of industrial relations in order to recover from the crisis and 
overcome its challenges. 
The study methodology, as agreed between the partners on the project includes:
- Desk survey and analysis of studies, legislation and main documents of the 
organizations of the social partners and the bodies for social dialogue, including sectoral 
collective labour agreements, statistical data, etc.
- Informational semi-standardized  interviews with social dialogue participants: 
representatives of the administration, of trade union federations, employers’ organizations 
which participate in the social and civil dialogue at national and branch levels. Practices 
in the brewery industry, construction, chemical industry, metallurgy, machine-building, 
wood processing and paper production are a special object of study.
- Case studies: “Stomana Industry” – Pernik; “Agropolychim AD” – Devnya and 
“Mondi Stambolijski EAD”.
- Secondary analysis of studies by the Institute for Social and Trade Union Studies 
(ISTUS) and other research institutions in the sphere of crisis and industrial relations.
The study allows for outlining the context within which industrial relations develop, as 
well as the new challenges in times of crisis and the possible solutions agreed for quicker 
recovery from the crisis.
6CHAPTER 1. FRAMEWORK OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
IN BULGARIA
 
1.1. Legislative and political framework of industrial relations
Establishing a new system of industrial relations and increasing the role of social 
dialogue is a part of the democratic changes at the beginning of Bulgaria’s transition 
towards a market economy. Social dialogue and collective bargaining played a crucial 
role in keeping the social peace, regulating relations between the workforce and the 
capital and in achieving a balance of their interests. 
The term “industrial relations” denotes the interaction between the government, trade 
unions and employers as regards and in relation to arranging labour relations and 
matters of standard of living of workers and employees. These relations are based on 
the common will of the three parties to cooperate and consult with each other. There 
is a range of classifi cations of the models of industrial relations and social dialogue 
which focus on different criteria: actors, level at which the dialogue takes place, rate of 
centralization, etc. Due to the relatively strong trade unions and the structural insuffi ciency 
of  employers’ organizations at the time when the system of industrial relations emerged 
in Bulgaria, a neo-corporate model was established, in which the state and the trade 
unions were leading parties in the dialogue. 1
The development of actual employers’ organizations took time but their establishment 
created opportunities for developing the system of industrial relations in the country. 
In effect, social dialogue in Bulgaria emerged on a blank spot, without past traditions 
or experience. One of the uncontested achievements of democracy in the country was 
namely the transition from centralized, state-determined labour relations to industrial 
relations based on the principles of modern social dialogue and social cooperation as 
well as the establishment of social dialogue institutions on different levels. 
The main prerequisites for this are as follows: 
- developing market relations and the overall economic environment;
- developing the regulatory base and liberalization of labour legislation;
- legitimizing the statute of social partners and institutionalizing their 
structures;
- the attitude of the government to social dialogue at national level, urged 
by the pressure of trade unions, employers’ structures and EU accession 
criteria. 
Due to the specifi c situation in the country at the beginning of the transition period, 
related to liberalization of the economy and massive strikes in enterprises, the focus 
was both on tripartite negotiations and on development of the legislative framework 
for industrial relations. This framework is based mainly on the Labour Code (LC) and a 
1 Teodor Dechev. Evolution of the model of industrial relations in Bulgaria – 1989 - 2002
7number of related regulatory legislative documents. Over the years the Code has been 
amended and expanded many times in order to refl ect the changes in society and the 
political situation, and the transposition of European legislation. Changes in legislation 
ensured the development of social dialogue and its institutionalization as the basis for 
the new system of industrial relations. 
In compliance with the legislative framework and the Bulgarian practice, the system of 
social dialogue is organized along the following levels:
 At national level social dialogue is conducted within The National Council for 
Tripartite Cooperation, set up in 1993. It has standing committees on different 
subjects.
 At sectoral/branch level there are 51 sectoral/branch councils for social 
cooperation with the participation of representatives of the respective 
represented sectoral/branch employers’ organizations and trade unions. In 
some sectors there are representatives of the state as an employer.
 At district level there are district councils for tripartite cooperation.  
 At municipal level there are 82 councils for social cooperation. Representatives 
of municipal authorities take part in the negotiations on budgetary activities 
(education, health care, culture, administration).    
 At enterprise level the participants in the negotiations are the employer and the 
existing trade union(s). 
Only employers’ and workers’ organizations, as well as their members, which have been 
recognized as representative national organizations can take part in the social dialogue 
on national and sectoral levels, as stipulated in the criteria for representativeness set 
down in the Labour Code.  
In recent years the tripartite cooperation at national level is expanding. New mechanisms 
are developed, such as: participation of the social partners in the work of the Parliament 
through a Consultative Council to the Labour and Social Policy Committee, and special 
working groups developing new labour and social legislation. The social partners participate 
in the management and supervision of a number of bodies in the sphere of employment, 
social and health insurance and vocational education and training, established along a 
tripartite principle, as well as in the Monitoring Committees of Operational Programmes. 
Establishing the Economic and Social Council (ESC) in 2003 and the National Institute for 
Conciliation and Arbitration to a great extent completed the process of institutionalizing 
the system of industrial relations. Creating the ESC as a new form of dialogue and 
consultations meets the need for changing the social communication in the country 
and for ensuring independent debate and democratic participation in decision-making 
through civil dialogue in compliance with European practices. 
Despite the well-established institutional framework of the social dialogue in the country, 
there are still a number of problems and challenges. 
8Tripartite cooperation, despite being relatively well-established in terms of institutions, 
is still conducted just formally and in many cases – ineffi ciently:
 - opinions and proposals of the social partners on main issues regarding the 
development of the country are neglected;
- the government adopts decisions unilaterally, only informing the social partners 
afterwards;
- using instruments, which are well-tested in European industrial relations, such 
as national agreements and social pacts was delayed, and only as late as 2006 the 
Social and Economic Pact was signed, but has not been fully implemented; 
- fragmentation of the social partners and social partnership – the number of 
social partners participating in the National Council for Tripartite Cooperation (NCTC) 
is 8, which makes the process of consolidating positions on important issues in the 
bodies for social dialogue diffi cult, increases confrontation, and decreases the effi ciency 
of social dialogue. 
There is still imbalance between the levels of social dialogue. The employers’ 
organizations and trade unions are more to blame for this than the state. Breaking free 
from “the shadow of the state” can only be done if the social partners have a clear 
social mandate by their members to hold binding negotiations, in other words, if they are 
representative enough. The development of autonomous bipartite dialogue at sectoral 
level is considered the weak link in the system of Bulgarian industrial relations. This is 
largely due to the employers’ structures at branch level which are not well-established or 
effi cient. Many of them base their representativeness only on their membership in the 
representative national organization and on the absence of trade union organizations 
in a number of branches. If the interests of workers and employers meet at this level, it 
would allow for the necessary fl exibility of industrial relations, especially in the conditions 
of crisis.
1.2. Main actors in industrial relations
1.2.1. Trade unions and workers’ representatives 
After the democratic changes in CEE countries which started in 1989, trade unions 
were among the fi rst civil society organizations to change most dynamically and in many 
countries were the main driving force behind the process of transformation. In Bulgaria 
this process was very strong. “Podkrepa” Labour Confederation emerged semi-legally 
a few months before the changes as an opposition organization upon the model of the 
Polish “Solidarność” with initial aim to protect the civil rights of the workforce, and within 
a short period of time attracted a signifi cant number of members. 
The Central Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions at the end of 1989 started radical 
restructuring through working for organizational and political independence and having 
as a main goal the protecting the interests of the workforce. In February 1990, the 
Extraordinary Congress of Bulgarian Professional Unions (BPU) turned into a Constituent 
Congress of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria (CITUB). CITUB 
has undergone enormous changes, and succeeded to transform, establish itself, and 
9keep its position as the biggest trade union organization in the country with its own place 
and role in the public environment. 
Establishing trade union pluralism in Bulgaria contributed to turning trade unions 
into key actors in the process of reforms, especially in the years of preparation and 
implementation of the new system of industrial relations. The policy of supporting 
reforms at an acceptable social cost and of establishing a new consensual culture of 
labour relations through social dialogue also strengthened their reputation, and allowed 
them to take the lead in constituting the new system of industrial relations. 
Currently trade unions’ domain is shared between two trade union confederations which 
have been recognized as representative - Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in 
Bulgaria and “Podkrepa” Labour Confederation, as well as a number of other small trade 
unions which have not been recognized as representative.
According to the last census in 2007-2008, CITUB has 328, 232 members and “Podkrepa” 
Labour Confederation - 91, 738. In the years of transition there is a continuous trend of 
decline in trade union density. Experts estimate this density to be 19-21 %. 
Representation of workers and employees through other channels, besides trade 
unions, is quite complicated and carried out through: 
- Representatives of the workers and employees in accordance with art. 7 (2) of 
the Labour Code. They are elected by the general assembly to represent their 
common interests on labour and social insurance relations before employers or 
governmental bodies. 
- In enterprises numbering 50 or more workers and employees, as well as 
in departments of enterprises which are organizationally and economically 
autonomous and number 20 or more workers and employees, in accordance 
with art. 7a of the Labour Code, the general assembly elects representatives on 
information and consultancy.
- Representatives of workers and employees are also elected in Committees/ 
Groups on Labour Conditions, as stipulated in the Law for Healthy and Safe Labour 
Conditions. 
1.2.2. Employers’ associations
Unlike trade unions which can boast over a hundred year tradition, real employers’ 
associations2, partners in industrial relations, did not exist before the changes in 1989. 
In the conditions of 100% state ownership, command and administrative management of 
the economy, the system ensured party control over nearly all top positions participating 
in the decision-making processes.
2 The existing Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and the Economic Chamber created in 1980 did not have 
the characteristics of employers’ organizations participating in industrial relations.
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The intense processes of privatization and restructuring lead to important changes and 
differentiation of employers’ interests. Their representation turned out to be a much 
more complicated process than expected. The logic of constructing “bottom-up” and 
the institutionalization of the employers’ side in the emerging system of industrial 
relations caused fragmentation of employers’ interests, which lead to the creation of 
a considerable number of organizations. However, the growing diversity of employers’ 
organizations, the fragmentation of their organizational structures and the possibility 
of dual or triple membership raises the question of legitimacy of representation. It 
also poses the question of the effi cient participation at different levels in the system of 
industrial relations, at sectoral/ branch level in particular. 
The criteria for representativeness of employers’ organizations which allow them to 
participate in the tripartite bodies for social dialogue and in other bodies, established 
along the tripartite principle, are regulated in the Labour Code. Currently six employers’ 
organizations are recognized as representative at national level: Bulgarian Industrial 
Association (BIA), Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI), Union for Private 
Economic Enterprise (UPEE), Bulgarian Union of Private Entrepreneurs “Vazrazhdane” 
(BUPE), Confederation of the Employers and Industrialists in Bulgaria (KRIB) and 
Bulgarian Industrial Capital Association (BICA). The fi rst four were recognized in 1993 
and the latter two – at the end of 2004 when the fi rst offi cial census of employers’ 
organizations was held. 
Over the last years there are two opposing trends in the development of employers’ 
organizations. 
The fi rst one outlines the institutionalization of representation of employers and the 
differentiation and consolidation of interests. It is seen in the creation of Association 
of Employers’ Organizations in Bulgaria (AEOB) in 1995 on the initiative of BCCI. This 
trend of self-identifi cation of the nature and essence of the organizations continues 
when the Union of Employers in Bulgaria (UEB) and the Bulgarian International Business 
Association came together to form organization of large and medium business in May 
2006 and with the formation of Confederation of the Employers and Industrialists in 
Bulgaria (KRIB). Bulgarian Industrial Association and Bulgarian Industrial Capital 
Association signed an Agreement for partnership with the aim of representing more 
effi ciently their common interests and goals. The process of consolidating employers’ 
interest will obviously lead to similar processes in the sphere of small business, as is 
the practice in other EU member states. Alongside this trend, there is a second one – of 
escalating confl icts between employers’ organizations. Since 2006 fi ve of the nationally 
representative employers’ organizations are in confl ict with KRIB.  
It is expected that the census of employers’ organizations, which aims to prove their 
representativeness at national level and is conducted in the fi rst half of 2012, will change 
the employers’ landscape. It is expected that some organizations will lose their statute of 
being representative due to the new, stricter criteria. 
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1.2.3. Central and local government 
The state participates in all bodies of tripartite cooperation through its bodies and 
representatives – Council of Ministers, individual ministries and ministers, district and 
municipal governor, mayors of municipalities/ their representatives, depending on the 
level on which cooperation is carried out. 
In the social dialogue the state has a regulatory role and the role of an employer. It 
not only discusses matters in the bodies for tripartite cooperation but makes the fi nal 
decisions.
1.3. System of collective bargaining
The processes which started after November 1989 laid the foundation of democratization 
of the political system and of transition from planned to market economy. This created 
the necessary prerequisites for recovering collective bargaining in the context of the 
new industrial relations3. Shaping the labour market and market economy requires 
introduction of new rules, regulations and interactions between the state, employers and 
trade unions as representatives of hired workers and employees. 
Collective labour bargaining is one of the main elements of the system of industrial 
relations, in particular, of the so-called “bipartite social dialogue”. The Labour Code 
says that collective labour bargaining is the right of trade unions and the obligation of 
employers and the signed collective labour agreement is mandatory in nature. 
The legislative framework of the system of collective bargaining is defi ned in the 
Labour Code, chapter four. Initially the framework of collective labour legislation was 
set up in 1993 but it was amended in 2002, 2006, 2008 and 2010. This provides 
institutionalization of the system of collective bargaining and clearly determines:
- subjects of bargaining;
- levels of bargaining;
- scope of bargaining;
- procedures of bargaining;
- force as regards the parties;
- other requirements, rules and conditions.
3 The beginning and basis of collective bargaining in our country is the General Agreement between CITUB, 
the Government and the National Council of Business Leaders which was signed in March 1990. It stipu-
lates the set-up of the system for coordination of interests and collective bargaining, including amend-
ments to the Labour Code.
12
The amendment of the Labour Code which came into force in 1993 created the necessary 
legal guarantees for turning collective bargaining into the main mechanism for regulating 
labour relations:
For the fi rst time collective labour agreements became a norm for regulating 
industrial relations; 
A lot of space for bargaining opened up at the expense of drastic curbing of the 
imperative provisions in the Labour Code since 1986, which did not provide real 
“space” for collective bargaining;
A new model of legal regulation of labour relations was created. Law kept its 
regulatory importance but it stipulates minimum norms for labour protection 
and defi nes the minimum level of rights of workers and employees and working 
conditions, leaving space to negotiate better conditions through collective 
labour agreements. 4
The Labour Code clearly defi nes the levels of collective bargaining – enterprises, 
branches/sectors and municipalities, and since 2010 the district level has been included 
as well.
It envisages a procedure, typical for European countries – extension of application of the 
agreement or clauses of the agreement to all enterprises in the sector/branch if required 
by the parties to the collective labour agreement. Since 2003 the collective bargaining at 
branch/sectoral level has been expanded and includes annual bargaining of minimum 
social security thresholds by economic activity. 
Regardless of the different attitudes to collective bargaining by different governments 
and employers, even in times of crisis, it continues to be an active instrument of 
industrial relations, creating opportunities to increase the competitiveness of the 
Bulgarian business and at the same time - protect the socio-economic rights of workers 
and employees.  
4 See Kamenov, D., E. Ribarova, N. Daskalova, T. Mihaylova, Foundations of Industrial Relations. Study 
book, CITUB, 2010; Handbook of the Trade Unionist, CITUB, 2007
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CHAPTER 2. CRISIS AND CHALLENGES FACING THE SOCIAL 
DIALOGUE
2.1. Impact of the crisis on the economy and employment
After three consecutive years (2006 - 2008) of high economic growth of more than 6%, 
in 2009 GDP marked a decline of 5.5 %. The most severely hit sectors were agriculture, 
industry and trade. In these, gross value added declined respectively by 9.5%, 8.2 % and 
8.0%. The attempts to recover the Bulgarian economy over the next two years were not 
very successful. In 2010 the insignifi cant economic growth of 0.4% was accompanied 
by a drop of minus 17.9 % in construction, and continuing declines of GVA in industry 
and agriculture. It was only in 2011 that some indications of recovery of industry were 
present (growth of GVA in this sector by 9.1 %), but overall, all other sectors stagnate. 
The economic growth over the last two years is due solely to increase in exports while 
domestic consumption, after a drop of 7.3 % in 2009, remains low. Investment activity 
continues to decline. Gross capital formation reports considerable declines for three 
consecutive years – minus 17.6 % in 2009, minus 18.3 % in 2010 and minus 9.7 % 
in 2011. This model of economic growth does not provide perspectives for the country 
because since the beginning of 2012, export shows a decreasing trend. It is obvious 
that without increase in domestic demand (consumer and investment), the Bulgarian 
economy will continue its futile efforts to move up from the bottom.  If we consider income 
distribution, despite some insignifi cant changes, compensations of employees over the 
last three years have been barely 37-38% of GDP. This is one of the lowest EU rates and 
shows that employees participate little in the distribution of the product.
Exports increase over the last two years improving substantially the trade balance. 
Furthermore, the low trade defi cit is the main factor for the positive position of the 
current account balance for the fi rst time at the end of last year. Budget defi cit in 2010 
under the Consolidated Fiscal Programme amounted to BGN 2, 822.8 million, which is 
4% of GDP. Over 90% of the defi cit was covered by domestic funding. The government 
measures for fi scal consolidation and the goal for achieving a balanced budget in 2014 
predetermined a trend towards curbing the budget defi cit. In 2011 it is 2.1% and the 
budgetary framework for 2012 envisages the amount of 1.3 % of GDP.
Infl ation in the country has been infl uenced by three main factors –international prices 
of energy carriers, the policy of state-regulated prices (most tangible in the increase of 
excise rates up to the agreed minimum European levels) and the contracted domestic 
consumption. Annual average infl ation (consumer price index) in 2010 dropped to 2.4 
but increased nearly twofold (4.2) in the following year, due mainly to the impact of 
continuously rising prices of oil and the energy carriers. With the government offi cial 
policy of income freeze, this impacted adversely household budgets.  
The relative share of population at risk of poverty and social exclusion in 2010 is 41.6 % 
and monetary poverty is at 20.7% (highest EUROSTAT data for EU-27, SILC). The process 
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of impoverishment is related to deepening social inequality – the Gini coeffi cient for 
income differentiation of households is one of the highest in Europe (33.2 in 2010).
The crisis affected severely the labour market, impacting mostly on decreasing 
employment and less so on the labour price. As regards the labour price, the dominating 
general attitude of employers is to freeze salaries (with some exceptions up or down, 
depending on branch specifi cs). For three years, since the onset of the crisis, jobs 
decreased by over 411 thousands, and employment went down to its 2004 level. 
Table 1:  Number of employed persons (in thousands) and employment coeffi cients 
(2008 - 2011) 
Indices 2008 2009 2010 2011
Employed persons at 15 years of age or older 3360,7 3253,6 3052,8 2949,6
Employed persons between 15 and 64 years of age 3306,2 3204,8 3010,4 2908,3
Employed persons between 20 and 64 years of age 3275,8 3178,6 2993,9 2896,9
Employment coeffi cient (15+) 50.8 49.4 46.7 45.6
Employment coeffi cient (15-64) 64.0 62.6 59.7 58.5
Employment coeffi cient (20-64) 70.7 68.8 65.4 63.9
Source: National Statistics Institute: Labor Source Survey.
Two industrial branches were most severely hit as regards employment. Absolute decrease 
of employed persons in the manufacturing industry is by 168.1 thousand, or 21.8% . In 
construction, the number of jobs dropped by 115 thousand (-33.8%). Together these 
two branches account for 72% of the drop in employment. Losses in other economic 
activities are considerably smaller. Three branches (water and sewage, trade and repair 
works, administrative and auxiliary activities) have reported an increase between 1.6 
and 10.8%. 
In view of professional qualifi cations, as expected, the biggest drop in employment is in 
professions which do not require special qualifi cations (minus 34%). This is a natural 
response – in the context of the crisis, the business fi rst dismisses low-qualifi ed 
workforce. Drop in the number of employed qualifi ed production workers and machine 
operators is much smaller (about 20%), while employment of analytic specialists has 
even increased by over 9 %. 
There are no signifi cant changes in the status structure of employment. The decrease 
rate in the number of employers, self-employed persons and employees is more or less 
similar – respectively minus 11.9 %, minus 14.7% and minus 12.0 %. In 2001, 87.8% of 
people in employment are employees, 7.5 % are self-employed, 3.7 % are employers, and 
unpaid family workers are 1%.   There is certain specifi cs in the distribution of employed 
by gender and status. Women employers and self-employed women are considerably 
less than men – only 30.3 % of employers and 37.6 % of self-employed are women. 
Among employees, their relative share is nearly the same as that of men (49.4 %), while 
women certainly dominate among unpaid family workers (60.8%).
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In general, the employment coeffi cient is higher for men by about 8-10 percentage points 
but in the last three years this gap is shrinking, which shows that decreased employment 
comes with certain gender differences. 
When recession started, it caused the fi rst waves of mass lay-offs at the beginning 
of 2009. This led to an increase of the unemployment coeffi cient to 6.8%. The trend 
became stronger in 2010 when the unemployment coeffi cient sharply rose to 10.2% and 
reached 11.2 % in 2011.
Table 2: Unemployed persons at 15 years of age or older (in thousands) and 
unemployment coeffi cients (2008 - 2011)
Indices 2008 2009 2010 2011
Unemployed persons at 15 years 
of age or older
199,7 238,0 348,0 372,3
Unemployment coeffi cients (percentage)
Overall: 5.6 6.8 10.2 11.2
By gender:
men
women
5.5
5.8
7.0
6.6
10.9
9.5
12.3
10.0
By age:
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 and older
12.7
5.7
4.3
4.9
5.2
16.2
6.9
5.5
5.8
5.9
23.2
11.4
8.1
8.7
8.9
26.6
13.2
9.1
9.3
8.7
Source: National Statistics Institute: Labor Source Survey.
One can see certain specifi cs in the dynamics and structure of unemployment:
First. In times of increased demand for workforce (e.g., 2008) construction and industry 
take up mostly unemployed men which leads to a lower unemployment coeffi cient for 
men compared against women. However, the crisis impact caused fast changes. The 
sharp decline in these two sectors of the national economy dismisses back to the 
labour market mostly male workforce. Men unemployment between 2009 and 2011 is 
considerably higher than unemployment among women – by over 2 percentage points. 
Second. Once again, the problem of youth unemployment is brought to the fore, after 
Bulgaria achieved good results. (in 2008 it decreased to 12.7%). Within two years only, 
though, unemployment coeffi cient in the 15 to 24 age range rose nearly twofold and in 
2011 reached the critical 30%. Without a doubt, the crisis hit most severely young people 
who are at great diffi culty to fi nd jobs after graduating from high school or university.
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Third. Comparison between employment and unemployment data shows drastic 
quantitative discrepancies between those leaving employment and those entering 
unemployment groups. For a three-year period employment has decreased by 411 
thousand people while unemployment has increased only by 173 thousand people. 
This shows that there are dynamic processes related to considerable in size and 
frequency transitions both in the status of the workforce and in the economic activity of 
the population. These processes are: decrease of registration rate of the unemployed, 
increase of grey employment, rise of emigrant fl ows and last but not least – increase of 
discouraged persons. 
Fourth. Only in 6.4% of the cases unemployment can be defi ned as current, i.e., related 
to dissatisfaction with working conditions and desire to change the employer. In its 
predominant part (41.9 %) unemployment is caused by layoffs and dismissals, and 
in 18.9% - by completion of temporary or seasonal job. Unemployed persons looking 
for their fi rst job are also in a diffi cult situation – their relative share is 17.5% of all 
unemployed. Largely, these are young people looking for professional realization on the 
labour market after graduating from school or tertiary education institution. 
Fifth. The qualitative characteristics of the unemployed deteriorate considerably. This is 
a clear sign of the weak competitiveness of the Bulgarian labour market. About 1/3 of 
the unemployed have basic or lower education. The unemployment coeffi cient of persons 
with basic education is 23%, while the coeffi cient of persons with primary or lower 
education is 49% (data for 2011). Respectively, the employment coeffi cient of these 
persons is extremely low – 18.4% for those with basic education and only 8.5 % for those 
with primary or lower education. In effect, this means that their chances of professional 
realization at the primary labour market are very slim. 
Sixth. As a result of the negative trends of the labour market the relative share of long-
term unemployed persons (12 to 23 months) is 23.3% while of those who have been 
unemployed for two or more years - 32.9%, or over 56% of the unemployed have largely 
lost their working habits and skills. This means that their adaptation and reintegration 
will require further funds and efforts. The long-term unemployment coeffi cient of 2.9% 
in 2008 increased to 6.3% in 2011 and is considerably higher for men (7.0%) than for 
women (5.5 %).
The offi cial policy of “income freeze” introduced in mid 2009 affected not only social 
transfers but the minimum monthly wage (MMW) as well as salaries funded by the state 
budget. In the end, this policy largely impacted remuneration in the private sector, too.
 In the period 2009 - 2011 the MMW was frozen at BGN 240 (123 euro) in 
the context of overall restrictive government policy as an anti-crisis measure. Under 
strong pressure from the trade unions and despite the disagreement of some employers’ 
organizations, a two-step increase of the MMW was negotiated with the government. The 
fi rst step was an increase to BGN 270 since September 1st  2011, and the second one – 
to BGN 290 since May 1st 2012. Despite these positive steps, the average monthly size 
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of MMW in 2011 (BGN 250) amounts to only 35.4 % of the average gross salary for the 
country (BGN 707) and this ratio is not expected to change signifi cantly in 2012.
 Salaries in the budget sector increased by diminishing rates – by 8.5% in 2009, 
by 6.2 % in 2010, and by only 1.7% in 2011. This increase resulted from staff optimization 
and annual bonuses received in some departments, not from  bargained or planned 
increases in the budget. In the context of the crisis the number of jobs in budget-funded 
activities declined by about 12%.
 The decline in employment in the real sector, too, was accompanied by 
considerable structural changes. With the increasing economic diffi culties all enterprises 
fi rst let go low-qualifi ed workforce and managed largely to keep high-productive and 
qualifi ed workforce. These structural changes, not taking into consideration the negative 
social effect, had a positive infl uence on some indices at the macroeconomic level. 
Labour productivity rose. There was also a slight increase in the relative share of labour 
compensation in GDP. 
 There was a tangible impact on the average monthly wage for the country, which 
continued growing, but more slowly compared to the pre-crisis period. The paradox of 
“frozen individual salaries and growing average monthly wage” was often brought to 
the fore by employers’ organizations as an argument that labour remunerations grow 
anyway, i.e., there is no need for new negotiations and agreements on monthly wages. 
Over the last two years growth rates of the real value of the average monthly wage for the 
country dropped to about 4%.
Table 3: Dynamics of the average monthly wage for the country (AMW)
Indices 2008 2009 2010 2011*
AMW – annual size (BGN) 6538 7309 7777 8487
Nominal growth (%) 26.5 11.8 6.4 9.1
Real growth (%) 12.6 8.8 3.9 4.7
Source: National Statistics Institute. 
* Preliminary data
2.2. Social dialogue and industrial relations in the context of crisis 
2.2.1. National level
With the fi rst symptoms of the coming economic crisis, which were felt in Bulgaria at 
the end of 2008, the social partners started intensive discussions on issues regarding 
employment, working hours and social security. They proposed to the government of the 
Triple Coalition, which was in power from July 2005 to July 2009, that an anti-crisis plan 
be developed. 
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Employers insisted on undertaking measures related to the fi nance system, banks and 
loans, as well as initiating taxation changes and activities focused on energy effi cient 
products and technologies.
Trade unions had to change their priorities and instead of demands for increase of 
incomes, they put fi rst the issue of keeping jobs, fi nancial stabilization, monitoring 
economic development together with the social partners, decrease of the informal 
economy by extending sectoral/ branch collective labour agreements. Trade unions 
(CITUB in particular) offered to the government and social partners the following – upon 
cuts of working hours, in view of keeping employment, companies will receive state 
subsidies.
Only few of the proposed measures were included in the decisions of the government. At 
the end of 2008 the mandatory minimum reserves of commercial banks in the central 
bank were decreased from 12 to 10 %. This freed extra credit resource and allowed for 
introducing a full guarantee for individuals’ deposits up to EUR 50, 000. A programme for 
promoting the temporary introduction of part-time working hours (4 hours) in enterprises 
was implemented. The employer pays the remuneration for 4 hours and the state pays 
additionally up to BGN 120. The employer can implement the programme for three 
months. The funding provided this implementation for 18, 000 jobs. 
Until the autumn of 2009, social partnership at national level had its highs and lows 
in the context of a growing economic crisis and with the frequent absence of nationally 
representative trade union confederations. In November 2008 they made the decision 
to denounce their signatures and withdraw from the Pact for Economic and Social 
Development of Bulgaria until 2009 (signed in 2006) due to systemic violations of the 
Pact by the Government, and to leave the National Council for Tripartite Cooperation. 
Despite this fact, experts of both confederations continued their work in individual 
commissions and working groups of the NCTC. 
After the elections and formation of the new government in September 2009 the 
activities of NCTC were renewed with the participation of all social partners. At the 
beginning of their mandate the political party Citizens for European Development 
of Bulgaria (GERB) demonstrated political will to recover the cooperation between 
government representatives and nationally representative organizations of employers 
and trade unions. The dialogue at national level within the work of the NCTC was quite 
active. Everybody agreed with the idea to optimize the social dialogue in trying to manage 
the crisis through creating a standing working group to the NCTC and enhancing the 
role of the Councils for Social Cooperation in branch ministries for developing sectoral 
(branch) anti-crisis programmes. Discussions of anti-crisis (stabilization) measures were 
initiated in the specially created working group to the NCTC. It adopted 32 anti-crisis 
measures by full consensus. They became part of the nine-month governmental anti-
crisis programme (August 2009 – April 2010). Some of the most important economic 
and structural measures were:
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- establishing an anti-crisis Committee to the NCTC aiming at developing national 
anti-crisis measures; 
- organizing branch meetings to develop branch anti-crisis measures; 
implementation of complex measures to curb the grey economy, including curbing tax 
evasion and strengthening border control against smuggled and dumped imports; 
- expanding the food voucher system to cover employees in the budget sector as 
well; 
- extension of sectoral/ branch collective labour agreements for which there are 
proposals by the social partners, parties to the agreements.
In late 2009 and early 2010 trade unions (CITUB and “Podkrepa” Labour Confederation) 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the implementation of the agreed commitments 
under the anti-crisis measures and came up with proposals for updating the anti-crisis 
programme in the short and long term in order to deal with the crisis and to implement a 
new model of sustainable growth. The social partners reached a consensus and adopted 
General Programme of Measures to Deal with the Crisis. The government had to start 
urgent negotiations with the social partners in the Programme and, at the end of March 
2010, 59 anti-crisis measures were negotiated. 
The parties to the agreement signed tripartite National Agreement for New Strategy for 
Financial Stabilization of State Social Security and improvement of pensions legislation. 
Nevertheless, there were ups and downs in the dialogue and partnership on national 
level. They were very obvious in the prolonged heated discussion on pension reform. The 
signing of the Agreement on Pension Reform in 2010 was also the result of a national 
protest rally organized by CITUB under the slogan: “NO to pension and healthcare reforms 
which cut rights”. The participation of over 15, 000 people dissuaded the government 
from initiating reforms unilaterally without considering the rights of workers and 
employees in Bulgaria and without looking for dialogue. The end-result was the signing 
of the agreement.
Within the framework of the Global Pact for Employment in March 2011 the government 
and the social partners approved a document entitled “Review of Bulgaria in consideration 
of the Global Pact for Employment”. It contains a detailed analysis of the economic 
development and labour market development, and recommendations for future policies. 
These recommendations were further developed in March 2012 at the Conference on 
Jobs and Incomes which was organized by the International Trade Union Confederation 
and the two national trade union confederations. 
The lack of effective social dialogue and the unilateral plans of the government on 
matters of crucial importance to the society caused constant outbreaks of confl icts. 
Protests related to healthcare were provoked by the closing of small hospitals as part of 
the reform (which was not consulted with the social partners and branch organizations). 
There were similar problems with the structures of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. 
There, whole institutes were closed down, others – merged together and a huge amount 
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of jobs were cut. Systemic lack of budgetary funding caused mass discontent and protest 
demonstrations of research scientists from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences between 
2010 and 2011.
After presidential and local elections were held at the end of 2011, marking a landslide 
victory of the party in power GERB, the government violated the social dialogue and 
undertook some actions against trade unions. These actions were directly related to 
the plans to remove the so-called “classifi cation based on time on the job”, to raise 
unilaterally retirement age from 2012 and to violate the National Agreement for “New 
Strategy for Financial Stabilization of State Social Security and for Improvement of 
Pension Legislation“ signed by the social partners and the prime-minister in the autumn 
of 2010. After an in-depth analysis of the cooperation and interaction between the 
social partners, CITUB and “Podkrepa” Labour Confederation decided to withdraw their 
delegations from the NCTC and the District Councils for Tripartite Cooperation and to 
organize national protests. 
Social tension at the end of the year escalated with the organized effective strike of the 
employed in the railway transport system. The confl ict dates back to March 2011 when 
the government and the management of the railway company announced plans to take 
a loan from the World Bank for stabilizing Bulgarian state railways under the condition 
to cut labour costs by 30%. In effect, that would have meant considerable layoffs and 
freezing of salaries. 
The railway workers held a one-hour strike as a warning in March. The strike ended by 
signing a Memorandum of Understanding for the Development of the Bulgarian Railway 
Sector. The government violated the agreed items of the Memorandum by undertaking 
measures to restructure and lay off workers in the company on a mass scale. The trade 
unions organized and conducted the longest railway strike in the history of Bulgaria. 
It lasted 26 days and losses amounted to more than BGN 2 million. During the strike 
there were attempts for lock-out which is forbidden by law, and court proceedings were 
initiated against workers on strike and their organizers. The strike ended with the signing 
of collective labour agreements in the companies of the sector. 
The social dialogue at national level has its institutions and is well-structured but is still 
not effi cient enough. Equality of the parties to the dialogue and compliance with European 
principles and rules of dialogue have often been put to the test at the attempts of the 
government to bypass the social partners and to exercise functions which are object of 
the structures of social dialogue. There is no connection or coordination between the 
established tripartite structures at the various levels of social dialogue – national level, 
sectoral/ branch level and district level. 
2.2.2. Intersectoral level
During the years when social partnership at national level was blocked (until mid 2009 
and at the end of 2011), there was a strengthened bipartite dialogue at national as well 
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as sectoral and branch levels. The social partners negotiated the anti-crisis measures in 
2009. 
A testimony to the expansion of infl uence and sustainable development of the bipartite 
social dialogue are the signed autonomous National Agreements regulating home-based 
work (introducing Convention 177 of ILO) and teleworking (introducing the Framework 
Agreement of the European social partners of 2002). Furthermore, amendments to the 
Labour Code related to the transposition of the Temporary Agency Work Directive of the 
EU were made. 
After the trade union confederations left the NCTC at the end of 2011 a number of 
bipartite meetings were held. Their aim was to fi ll in the vacuum caused by the blocking 
of the tripartite dialogue which resulted from the unilateral actions of the Government. 
After negotiations, employers and trade unions reached an agreement on common 
proposals in three areas:
1. Undertaking measures to stabilize the pension system.
2. Legislative changes improving the system of tri- and bipartite dialogue 
(amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the NCTC to guarantee effi ciency 
and transparency of its work, equality of the social partners and adherence to 
the rules on the part of the state).
3. Legislative changes related to the development of industrial relations. 
The proposed changes aimed to stabilize the social security system and improve the 
quality of social dialogue in the country as well as to guarantee that the commitments 
agreed on by the social partners will be taken into account during the legislative process. 
After the fi nal proposal package was prepared with consensus between the social 
partners, it was presented to the Prime Minister. The agreement of the government to 
hold negotiations on the issues raised was the reason for the trade unions to return to 
the tripartite council.  
2.2.3. Sectoral level and enterprise level
From the start of the fi nancial and economic crisis in the country the social partners 
focused their attention on the development of sectoral/ branch anti-crisis measures 
and packages of measures to cope with the consequences of the crisis, taking into 
consideration the specifi cs of the crisis in every distinct branch. Such measures were 
developed by the social partners in the machine-building industry, construction, chemical 
industry, wood processing and furniture industry, paper industry, brewery industry, water 
and sewerage sector, and others. 
The signed Agreement on Anti-Crisis Measures for the Brewery Industry focuses on the 
role of information and consultancy between employers and trade unions, as well as 
on corporate social responsibility as factors which can counteract the crisis and ensure 
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more sustainable competitiveness of enterprises. The parties agreed to conduct an 
internal audit on health and safety on the workplace. As regards incomes, it was agreed 
to develop internal rules for labour assessment taking into account labour productivity, 
infl ation, qualifi cation and functional mobility of workers. As regards fl exible organization 
of working hours the Agreement envisages to calculate overall working hours, taking into 
consideration work-private life balance. 
The social partners in the Branch Council on Social Partnership in the Chemical Industry 
decided that the Council should exert the functions of an anti-crisis council and should 
hold monthly meetings to review and monitor the current information on crisis impact 
in the branch. Measures are focused at strengthening the government policy in price 
formation for energy carriers because the branch is one of the big consumers of natural 
gas. The social partners expressed demands for stronger customs control on the imports 
of ammonium nitrate. The representative of Ministry of Economy, Energy and Tourism 
took the commitment to recover traditional orders of individual enterprises in the branch 
such as caoutchouc producers. The council promised to assist the business for active 
participation in grant schemes under Operational Programme “Competitiveness” and 
assigned to social partners at enterprise level to continue the dialogue in seeking fl exible 
mechanisms and protective anti-crisis measures in enterprises. 
One of the most severely affected by the global fi nancial crisis branches is construction. 
Having analyzed the state of the branch, the impact of decreasing foreign and 
domestic investments, the adverse conditions for granting loans to business and the 
unfair competition of external contractors, mostly from non-EU countries, the social 
partners came up with Anti-Crisis Programme. It contains 14 measures which aim to 
create adequate competitive environment; to accelerate absorption of funds under 
European programmes; shorten the lagging behind and guarantee rhythmical payment 
to construction companies by budgetary spending units. The government shall state that 
non-EU companies should not participate in public procurements tenders, if they use 
direct or indirect aid through public resources in any form, and thus violate or present a 
threat to competition.   
The aim of the agreements in the cellulose–paper industry and in the wood processing 
and furniture industry is to minimize losses of enterprises and personnel. The social 
partners agreed to prevent layoffs on a mass scale and drop of income of the employed. 
If crisis situations should occur, the social partners will assist the transition to decreased 
number of working hours and application for subsidized employment of personnel. If 
possible, they shall assist in the dissolution of contracts with external companies and 
delegate responsibilities to the personnel available. They also agreed to assist in market 
research and changing part of the nomenclature in accordance with the shrinking of 
consumer demand; in ensuring sustainability of employment through increasing staff 
expertise in view of higher adaptability, productivity and competitiveness, including 
through developing and applying for projects funded by European funds. 
During the crisis period (2009 - 2011), there is sustainability in the development of 
collective bargaining at sectoral/ branch level (see Table № 4).  
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Тable № 4: Main trends in collective bargaining 
Year Overall number of 
collective labour 
agreements
Sectoral collective labour 
agreements
Branch collective labour 
agreements
2009 73 10 63
2010 71 8 63
2011 69 8 61
Source: General Labour Inspectorate, database for collective labour agreements 
In the diffi cult economic situation the intensity and dynamics of the negotiation process 
remain unchanged when compared against the former agreement periods. Timely 
renewal of collective labour agreements in force and the maintenance of their number 
create opportunities to keep the basic key parameters from the previous labour contracts. 
In 2010 and 2011 the importance of branch collective bargaining increased due to the 
extension of four collective labour agreements – in the water and sewage system, the 
brewery industry (the agreement is the fi rst one extended in 2010 and later a new one 
was signed in 2011, it was extended again with a decision by the minister of labour 
and social policy), the mining industry, cellulose and paper. Thus, the possibility of 
extension of sectoral and branch collective agreements upon request by the parties to 
the agreements, which was stipulated in the Labour Code back in 2003, was applied for 
the fi rst time. This assisted the inclusion of 38 thousand more people in the coverage of 
collective labour agreements and in the context of crisis keep the coverage practically 
unchanged (over 30%). 
The economic crisis increased the responsibilities of employers and trade unions by sectors 
to keep jobs and solve employment issues. In all renewed collective labour agreements 
at this level the parties bind the signing with the specifi c fi nancial and economic situation 
in the branch and the specifi c enterprise and with the most immediate perspectives for 
development expected in the short term. In this sense, employers commit to ensure 
the necessary conditions for employment and normal fulfi llment of work obligations. It 
is a set practice for employers’ structures to discuss projects and plans for changes 
in the production and management structures in advance with the trade unions when 
such projects and plans will substantially impact the specifi cities of labour relations and 
employment in the company.
As an anti-crisis measure, more than 2/3 of sectoral/branch collective labour 
agreements (Sectoral/Branch CLA) stipulate that upon temporary scarcity of funds to 
pay salaries and upon fulfi llment of labour obligations in good faith, monthly payment of 
labour remuneration is guaranteed within a concrete agreed amount, with the remaining 
amount still owing, together with the legal interest.
It is important to mention the agreements achieved in some Sectoral/Branch CLA in 
order to curb the consequences of the economic crisis in the sector/ branch or the 
companies affected. Thus, for example, Sectoral CLA  in Trade makes it mandatory for 
enterprises and companies affected by the crisis to sign agreements between workers 
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and trade unions with concrete measures to keep employment and not allow for a drop 
in remuneration. Tourism focuses on using opportunities to assign different work to 
workers and employees within the same or other enterprise, temporary freeze of salaries 
at a certain level – in the cases, where the alternative is to cut jobs, taking unpaid leave 
of absence by those employed in the affected activities and if the unpaid leave should 
continue for more than 30 days, benefi ts are paid by funds of the enterprise. In cases of 
“inevitability” the number of staff is cut after a written agreement is reached with the trade 
unions. The workers and employees who are laid off are sent to the labour exchange and 
after a certain time period are again hired to work for the company.   The Federation of the 
Trade Union Organisations in the Forestry and Wood processing Industry (FTUOFWI) has 
signed concrete agreements for anti-crisis measures with the employers. In Branch CLA- 
knitwear some agreements focus on greater fl exibility of the processes of employment in 
the sector and mobility of the workforce. In the sectors farming, food industry, tourism, 
etc, temporary, seasonal or short-term jobs and activities are the object of agreement 
and require the signing of temporary labour contracts. The agreed measures in the CLA 
of DSK Bank AD are quite interesting. They envisage prevention of job cuts, including 
temporary use of part-time working day/ week and application of fl exible employment – 
hiring through agencies for temporary work, seasonal hiring, hiring per hour.
Using part-time working hours if the volume of work has decreased is a measure to 
provide for employment upon defi cits in the Branch CLA in sector Water and Sewage as 
well. There is an innovative text in the Branch CLA of the Agricultural Cooperatives, which 
envisages that seasonal workers who participate in agricultural campaigns every year, 
make full use of all clauses of the Branch CLA until they are dismissed and sent to the 
labour exchange after consultations between employers and trade unions. 
 In nearly all sectors the practice is continuing of negotiating the criteria for selection of 
personnel upon layoffs or other dismissals due to structural changes, privatization or 
fi nancial and economic diffi culties. The parties agree on the procedure for termination 
of labour relations and protection upon dismissals, the order for conducting mass 
dismissals and in rare cases – on cooperation in fi nding jobs for the laid off persons or 
creating conditions for their preliminary pre-qualifi cation – agriculture, metal industry, 
miners, Bulgarian Telecommunication Company, Bulgarian Posts, construction, state 
departments, light industry, banks, trade and others. 
In individual cases measures for new job openings are negotiated. There are good 
practices in the Branch CLA metallurgy, according to which the parties agree on mutual 
measures for impact on the labour market and employment in the branch and the 
regions in view of achieving sustainable sectoral development and competitiveness of 
enterprises. Sectoral collective labour agreements in transport and construction include 
texts protecting the rights of persons working abroad. 
In Sectoral CLA for the metal industry there is agreement on the obligations of the parties 
to create national and regional centres for training and qualifi cation improvement on 
basic machine-building professions and activities based on more detailed clarifi cation 
of the problems and needs for staff, and on the basis of the results of the strategy for 
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development of machine-building. At the same time branch collective labour agreements 
for the light industry stipulate the creation of buffer branch funds for training which are to 
be managed by branch chambers and controlled by trade unions and employers. These 
agreements are a step towards the implementation of successful branch policies for life-
long learning and achieving competitive and sustainable industrial growth. 
According to the Civil Servant Act, civil servants have the right to trade unions but do 
not have the right to collective bargaining and strikes. In view of overcoming legislative 
barriers to collective bargaining in the budget sector, over the last years the branch trade 
union structures of CITUB in agriculture and state governance expand the practice of 
signing (additional) agreements for civil servants. These agreements arrange better 
labour and social conditions as well as protection of collective interest for servants in 
Executive Agency “Hail Suppression”, Executive Agency “Selection and Reproduction 
in Animal Breeding”, National Veterinary Medicine Service, Social Assistance Agency, 
Employment Agency and National Revenue Agency.  They present these agreements at 
the General Labour Inspectorate where they are registered under the regime for CLA. 
Another aspect of these agreements is that they can be of unlimited duration due to 
their character of a free agreement between two parties for which there is no imperative 
provision as regards duration. 
The overall conclusions on collective bargaining at sectoral/ branch level are that 
employers and trade unions, taking into account modern realities and as a result of 
mutual efforts and understanding: 
 manage to keep main agreements and key parameters from the previous 
agreement period in diffi cult branch negotiations;
 in some sectors, they manage to negotiate a package of protective and anti-
crisis measures;
 though rarely, in some sectors they reached an agreement on new essential 
clauses defi ning the new vision of CLA (on corporate social responsibilities, the 
processes of information and consultation, life-long learning, work/private life 
balance etc).
Social Dialogue at Company Level
What is typical of social dialogue at company level is its institutionalization, with 
established committees/ councils for social partnership, where together with the 
problems of collective bargaining are carried out information and consultation processes 
between the social partners for all problems in the fi eld of labour and insurance. 
During the monitored period the number of registered in the regional labour inspection 
offi ces collective agreements in companies has decreased slightly (Table № 5). The main 
reasons for reducing the number of collective agreements in companies are both the 
crisis and its consequences in a number of heavily hit by it industries  in the real sector 
(construction, machine building, light industry), as well as the delegated budgets in 
the public sector (secondary education, healthcare and municipal administration). The 
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option of not renewing all the collective agreements have been used but rather of signing 
annexes to them which is provided for in the agreements themselves.
Table № 5: Information on the number of collective agreements in force in companies 
by year
Year CBA (+ annexes) total CBA Annexes 
2008 1828 1493 335
2009 1499 1261 238
2010 1596 1321 278
2011 1616 1332 284
Source: General Labour Inspectorate Executive Agency 
What is typical of collective bargaining at company level is not allowing decrease in the 
amount of the agreements in the previous CBA and the focus of the agreements to a 
large extent is related to keeping employment, income and the social benefi ts for workers 
and employees. There are clauses agreed on the procedures, and in case lay-offs are 
necessary, the measures shall be coordinated with the trade unions. The selection 
criteria are also specifi ed which to a maximum degree shall be in compliance with the 
need to retain qualifi ed workers and employees - education, professional qualifi cation, 
additional qualifi cations related to the job performed, level of performance of the job, 
etc. In many of the CBA there are clauses that envisage that laid-off workers shall be 
hired again and the work volume shall be restored once the fi nancial and economic 
situation of the companies improves.
All collective bargaining agreements in the real sector contain agreements for options 
to reduce working time which shall be consulted and coordinated with the trade unions. 
As regards the agreements for labour payment at company level there is a trend of 
increasing the amounts of the additional payments at the expense of main salaries – for 
night shifts, extra hours, working in unfavourable labour conditions, for work experience, 
etc.  
During the crisis a number of companies agreed on social packages for the persons 
subject to lay off and the focus was on social benefi ts to the most vulnerable groups of 
workers. The main agreements are related to offering compensatory payment of a larger 
number of salaries than planned in the LC, in case of lay-offs. 
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Stomana Industry in the town of Pernik is part of Greek Sidenor Group and is the 
second largest steel company in Bulgaria. The company’s production is almost 85% 
export-oriented. In November 2008 the management announced its plans to undertake 
measures to overcome the consequences of the crisis. The decision is motivated by 
the signifi cant decrease in the demand for products both on the domestic and on the 
global market, and the collapse of the steel prices globally due to the global fi nancial 
and economic crisis. The measures include terminating all investment projects and 
laying off 300 out of 1,100 workers.  
The trade union organizations in the company with CITUB and LC “Podkrepa” have 
initiated negotiations with the employer with demands for compensating the planned 
lay-offs of workers. The fi rst agreement in Bulgaria was signed for compensatory 
measures in mass lay-off due to the crisis. 
The package of social measures keeps a number of social benefi ts for the laid-off 
workers which have been agreed upon in the CBA: for additional healthcare insurance, 
Christmas bonuses, organizing re-training courses for the laid-off depending on the 
demand on the labour market as well as payment of 4 to 10 salaries to the laid-off 
workers, etc.
Agropolychim AD – Devnya is owned by the American Acid and Fertilizers (joint 
venture between Davenport Industries and Yumicor) and produces nitrogen and 
phosphorous fertilizers for the domestic and  global markets. The crisis has affected 
the fertilizer industry in the chemical sector the most due to the increase in the 
prices of the raw materials for fertilizer production and of natural gas, as well as the 
great contraction on the domestic market due to failure to pay the subsidies to the 
agricultural producers who are the main consumer of fertilizers. According to the 
forecasts of leading Bulgarian and international experts, the unfavourable condition 
on the markets will deepen with the crisis. 
In this situation the employer and the trade union organizations of CITUB and LC 
“Podkrepa” are discussing the aggravating trends for the development of the company 
and their conclusion is that the only option to stabilize the company is streamlining the 
staff, i.e. mass lay-offs. In order to alleviate the unfavourable consequences of  lay-
offs, the parties agreed and signed an agreement for laying off of 200 workers, and 
the workers and employees are suggested to voluntarily leave against a compensation 
of the amount of fi ve gross monthly salaries. More than 200 Bulgarian workers have 
benefi ted from this measure. The parties also agreed that in case of a favourable 
change of the market conditions and a need for expanding the staff of the company, 
on a priority basis and in line with the strategy for human resource development  in 
the company, the laid-off workers and employees shall be offered a job corresponding 
to their education and specialty.
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Mondi Stambolyiski EAD is a subsidiary of Mondi Group and is the largest paper 
producing company in Bulgaria. In February 2009 the Board of Directors of the group 
made a decision to close down or to sell off a number of subsidiaries of the group in 
Europe – Denmark, France, Hungary, Spain, etc., the Bulgarian company included. 
This is a result of the plan for restructuring the group in order to limit the effects of 
the crisis. The diffi culties have to do with the more complicated market conditions 
and the increased price of raw materials needed for the production of paper – timber 
and energy. The Bulgarian company is in less favourable conditions because timber 
price has increased manifold and is one of the highest in Europe. The management of 
Mondi Stambolyiski EAD informs the trade unions in the company about the planned 
mass lay-off – 350 workers out of 412. The remaining about 60 qualifi ed workers will 
maintain the production installations and in case the market conditions improve the 
company can recover its work. 
There are three trade union organizations represented in Mondi – CITUB, LC “Podkrepa“ 
and the Association of the democratic trade unions. Upon their initiative there have 
been a few meetings with the management at which the trade unions insist that an 
agreement be made with a package of measures for the laid-off workers. Under the 
pressure of the trade unions an agreement was signed at the company with a package 
of compensation measures for the laid-off workers who are most vulnerable on the 
labour market  – in pre-retirement age; disabled and with poor health; family members 
who work in the company; single parents -breadwinners; mothers with children, etc.
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CHAPTER 3. IMPACT OF THE SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND THE 
POLITICAL RESPONSES
3.1. Changes in the legislative framework
The changes in the labour legislation related to industrial relations of the recent years 
include mainly transposing the European legislation in a number of areas: rights of posted 
workers, informing and consulting workers and employees, working time, in particular 
working part time, leaves, termination of contracts, etc. The changes in the labour and 
social legislation on employment and labour conditions have been the result of intensive 
social dialogue and consultations at the National Council for Tripartite Cooperation. 
The institutionalization of industrial relations continued, and in 2010 the social 
partnership at regional level was legally provided for through the possibility for creating a 
regional council for tripartite cooperation.  
In the end of 2011 the National Council for Tripartite Cooperation discussed new criteria 
for representativeness of employers’ and trade unions’ organizations that have been 
into force since 2012 through the respective amendments in the Labour Code, and now 
serve as the basis for the census of the trade unions’ and employers’ organizations. 
The new and stricter criteria for representativeness were accepted, especially by the 
employers’ organizations with great opposition and even led to a President’s veto which 
was not accepted by the Parliamentary majority. 
A number of changes have been made to the Labour Code and the Social Security Code 
related to national autonomous agreements of the social partners for work from home 
and telework which stipulate the labour and social rights and the labour conditions of 
workers from home and teleworkers. 
Drastic changes have been made in the Labour Code and in a number of other laws 
related to the regulation of hiring workers through agencies for temporary work and the 
transposing of the Directive for agencies for temporary employment. Since the social 
partners could not reach a consensus and could not agree on the transposition of the 
Directive, it was adopted through relevant legislative changes.
These changes create an opportunity through changes in the legislative framework to 
implement in practice the principles of fl exible security on the labour market. 
The new labour inspection legislation (2010) and the tripartite principle as well as the 
agreement between trade unions and the General Labour Inspectorate in 2009 created 
the setting to respond to the challenges of the crisis related to non-registered employment 
and delay and non-payment of salaries in a number of companies. 
The social dialogue has also led to changes in legislation, related to the crisis, in other 
spheres, described in part 3.4.
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3.2. Fiscal instruments
A number of consecutive governments in Bulgaria consistently implemented policy 
targeted at achieving competitive advantages – in view of attracting foreign investments, 
believing that this will automatically lead to high and sustainable economic growth, 
new and better quality jobs, reduction of grey employment. The instruments of these 
policies were: reduction of direct taxes at the expense of the indirect ones, reduction of 
the amount of the social security contributions and mainly of the pension contributions, 
maintaining an artifi cially low labour price, liberalization of the labour legislation.
The results from the implementation of these policies and instruments can be illustrated 
by the following facts and statistical data:
 Bulgaria is the country with lowest rates of direct taxes in the EU – 10% tax on 
profi t and 10% fl at tax on the income of individuals (with no tax-free minimum).
 The difference in the ratio direct/ indirect taxes is 34.6% in favour of revenues 
from indirect taxes, whereas the EU average distribution is of only 4.7% a 
difference in favour of indirect taxation.
 Only in the period 2006–2010 the amount of the pension insurance 
contribution was reduced by 15 percentage points and the revenues from 
contributions cover less than half of the pension costs.
 The Bulgarian pension system is turning from an insurance system into a tax-
funded system – a transformation that has extremely negative consequences.
 Bulgaria is still the state with the lowest incomes in the EU – in 2011 the total 
income per person from a household is 161 euros, the average salary 361 
euros, and the average pension of 1 pensioner 136 euros.
 For a period of 3 years (2008-2011) the number of employed dropped by 
15.4% which means 378, 714 less jobs.
Against this background the decrease of the foreign direct investments was dramatic 
– more than 5 times. The infl ow of foreign direct investments decreased not only due 
to the investors’ conservatism and the fear from the crisis. In the case of Bulgaria, the 
country with the lowest taxes and the lowest incomes, the withdrawal of investors is 
obviously due to factors of different nature, e.g. clumsy administrative system, high 
corruption risk, bad infrastructure, low level and quality of public services. It is an illusion 
to think that low taxes are the decisive factor that attracts foreign investments this is 
especially not the case with serious and strategic investors. 
The current tax policy not only does not lead to sustainable development, but also 
exacerbates the problems of poverty and social inequality. The policy of low direct 
and high indirect taxes has resulted in a unique structure of tax income, which naturally 
burdens low and medium-income social groups quite heavily. This “reverse tax structure” 
in fact aggravates poverty and income differentiation rather than contributing to a 
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fairer taxation and increasing the solidarity in society for solving the problems of social 
exclusion.
Through the gradual reduction of the amount of insurance contributions for pensions 
the system has gone in the wrong direction to accomplish untypical goals – to 
stimulate competitiveness and to fi ght against the grey economy by creating a 
“stimulating business environment”. The pension system, its fi rst, solidarity pay-as-you-
go pillar in particular, was considered as a back-up for reducing the costs of the business 
and for creating a more favourable investment climate. The low adequacy of insurance 
protection has a negative infl uence in two directions – fi rst, it increases distrust in the 
solidarity insurance pillar which directly leads to partial insurance and grey employment; 
second – this is a prerequisite for opening new jobs with low social protection, rather 
than for generating quality employment.
In the conditions of real crisis and budget defi cit the government declares that no 
signifi cant changes will be made in the current tax system, as such a measure would 
hinder the chances of overcoming the crisis instead of facilitating this process. All main 
tax rates have been retained – the corporate tax, the individual income tax (10% fl at 
tax), VAT, there is a slight increase only in excise duties due to the country’s commitment 
to gradually reach the minimum EU rates. In this situation the government focused its 
efforts in three directions: increasing the collection rate of tax revenues and social 
security contributions; streamlining and restructuring of costs; support to the European 
initiative for a fi scal pact.
As regards the fi rst direction the social partners, when developing the austerity package 
in March 2010, proposed fi scal supporting measures – sale of prescribed emission 
units, privatization of minority state shares, taxation on gambling profi ts, introduction 
of “luxury” tax, but most of them have not been implemented or their enforcement has 
been rather slow. In a statement, the Economic and Social Council of the Republic of 
Bulgaria also focused on the potential ways for restricting VAT frauds, tax and social 
insurance evasion, which could yield considerable revenues for funding urgent social 
exclusion policies (ISC/2/006/2009). 
The enhanced control of the National Revenue Agency since the middle of 2011 as 
well as the undertaken actions for connecting the cash registers with the information 
system of the Agency yielded positive results and generally improved the collectability 
of tax revenues. In the conditions of fl uctuating rates of industrial production and ever 
decreasing employment, this is truly an achievement, and in the long term the stricter 
control according to trade unions would mean good opportunities to improve the tax 
system towards a progressive tax continuum or at least the introduction of a tax-free 
minimum and an additional second level for the highest income. As to this direction, 
however, reaching a consensus at this stage seems impossible.
As far as expenditure is concerned the biggest structural changes were made in relation 
to funding the active and passive labour market policies. The budget defi cit made the 
government undertake unpopular measures in the second half of 2009. Initially the 
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costs for active policies were reduced to 90% of the approved for 2009 BGN 190 million. 
In August resulting from the additional measures for limiting the interest-free costs and 
transfers to the republican budget for 2009 a new reduction was made in the budget for 
active policy. Thus, the revised amount of funds for active policy of the Labour Agency 
was reduced to BGN 165.8 million. As a relative amount these funds constitute 0.24% 
of GDP, and after the dramatically cut budgets for 2010, 2011 and 2012 the funds for 
active labour market policies (only BGN 63-65 million per year) now amount to about and 
below 0.09% of GDP.
With constantly decreasing resources from the state budget the effi cient use of funds 
from OP “Human Resource Development” 2007-2013 in the best possible way has 
increasing signifi cance for overcoming the crisis . If in 2009 BGN 8.2 million or 5% of all 
funds of the operational programme were spent on active labour market policies, in 2010 
they increased to BGN 34.1 million (35% of all funds). Thus there was a considerable 
restructuring of the sources for funding active policies – a trend that continued in the 
following years.
As regards passive labour market policies, upon trade unions’ pressure – after a change 
in the Social Security Code - the ceiling of unemployment compensation was removed 
and it was fi xed at 60% of the average security income over the past 18 months. This 
restored the justice and the force of the main security principle, i.e. the compensation 
amount depends on the security contributions. 
These positive changes however were done in an uncertain fi scal environment. In 
the context of economic growth and low unemployment rate the amount of security 
unemployment contribution was 3% and every year the fund would end with a surplus. 
Instead of keeping accumulating additional funds as a cushion against potential negative 
changes on the labour market, the contribution amount was reduced to 1% as of 1 
October, 2007. The problems emerged in 2009 when in the context of a real crisis the 
funds for passive labour market policies were insuffi cient. Thus, the amount of BGN 209 
million in the Unemployment Fund in 2006 was gradually reduced to BGN 54 million in 
2008, and then in 2009 there was a defi cit of BGN 70 million which in 2010 and 2011 
went beyond BGN 150 million. 
In international perspective Bulgaria’s government signed the EU Fiscal Pact but made 
it clear that it did not accept the conditions for tax harmonization and that the country 
could have fi nancial commitments to the Pact only after it joins the Eurozone. The support 
for the European Fiscal Pact domestically was refl ected in two benchmarks adopted by 
the parliament – a 2% budget defi cit and a ratio of the budget income to GDP of 35%. 
The third element of this fi scal policy of the government is actually aimed at freezing the 
parameters of the current tax system and any changes in the future shall be made only 
with qualifi ed majority of the Parliament. For that purpose however there is a need for 
certain changes in the country’s Constitution. What can really happen right from the start 
next year, and what trade unions have insisted on the most, is the introduction of the 
fi nancial transactions tax of  1% rate - a European idea which is not equally approved in 
the various EU member states, amongst social actors and economic circles.
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3.3. Changes in collective bargaining and fl exibility of salaries
The economic development of Bulgaria after 2008 – the fi rst stage of the fi nancial crisis 
and the recession afterwards in some sectors have inevitably affected social dialogue 
and collective bargaining, even though to a different degree in the different sectors/ 
branches and companies.
General development 
There is an increase in the deregulation of industrial relations. Its manifestation is not 
so much in its classical form – such as increased importance of agreements (trilateral 
and bilateral), of collective bargaining agreements or even for consultations, at the 
expense of legislation. Rather, there is deregulation which is expressed in modifi cation 
of the interpretation of legislative norms in the process of collective bargaining and 
agreements in individual sectors and companies. This for example affects the regular 
payment of salaries, the amount of remunerations for experience on the job and 
professional experience, the amount and mechanisms of payment of other additional 
remunerations – for extra labour and others.
Another trend is the decentralization of collective bargaining – shifting the importance 
of agreements from sector to company level. This trend of course has been observed 
since the beginning of the new millennium and its development has been relatively slow 
so far. 
The decentralization can be manifested in different dimensions – in some sectors and 
branches it is objectively defi ned – due to the specifi cities of the sector, poor organization 
of hired workers or of employees or both. In these situations more often than not 
decentralized collective bargaining is with mutual consent between partners or due to 
the obvious lack of organized partners on sector or branch level.
In other sectors/ branches the decentralization is more often than not forceful and 
exclusively an employers’ and employers’ associations’ initiative. In the production of 
chemical products this has been a constant trend since 2002. Similar is the case in 
electronics and electrical industry as well as in some of the branches in the light and food 
industry where employers refuse to negotiate at that level. The processes of reforms and 
restructuring as well as the fi nancial defi cit in the fi eld of culture have been among the 
main reasons due to which employers have delayed since December 2007 the renewal 
of 4 branch CBA and 1 sector agreement. There was a breakthrough in 2011 when a 
sector collective agreement was signed for workers in museums. 
There are sectors and branches where there is no collective bargaining – neither at 
sectoral level, nor in companies, since hired workers are not organized in trade unions/ 
or the presence of trade unions in separate companies is symbolic. This mainly holds 
for the services – trade at real estates, consultancy business, part of domestic services, 
great part of fi nancial services (with the exception of some big banks), information 
technologies and some branches of the food industry – beverage production, meat 
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production, some branches of the light industry, etc. In the industrial sector this is often 
due to break-down of trade union structures that existed earlier.
The processes of collective bargaining in most sectors and branches continue with 
agreements for sector collective labour agreements but with some diffi culties. The 
diffi culties appear right from the beginning of new negotiations, in the very process 
and discussion of ideas, and the trends are for reducing some benefi ts and/or freezing 
additional remunerations as well as for the modifi cation of some norms in legislation.
The process of dissemination of the collective labour agreements5 and expanding the 
scope of coverage as to new economic activities and enterprises that started in 2009 
is also continuing, though very slowly. There is however a strong opposition amongst 
employers and their organizations and there is one case of contestation to the court 
and cancelling a decision of the minister due to breaching the procedure. The main 
arguments are the extremely high requirements of the sector CLA and the inability to 
be fulfi lled by some employers. There are also reserves expressed by some of the trade 
unions – they have doubts as regards the meaning and the benefi t of this process since 
this practice does not, in their opinion, lead to expanding the trade unions’ membership.
Peculiarities for some sectors and companies
In the public sector (healthcare, education, culture, public administration, etc.) there 
are negotiations on three levels: sector/ branch negotiations; negotiations on municipal 
level – in individual municipalities; negotiations in the organisations. For the public 
administration the negotiations are often quasi-branch – in legal entities that have 
structures and departments across the country (national agencies and others). The 
negotiations at company and/or at municipality levels are not ubiquitous, rather the 
main role is played by the negotiations in the sectors. The specifi city of the collective 
bargaining process is strongly infl uenced by the limit of the budget funds and the 
regulatory mechanisms for their distribution. Yet, in these sectors, especially in secondary 
education and healthcare, there are negotiations on a regular basis and they usually 
fi nish with agreements.
There is also peculiarity in the subsidiaries of multinational companies (MNC) in 
Bulgaria. In some of them there are relatively strong trade union structures with infl uence 
on the management and well developed collective bargaining and agreement processes 
as well as relatively high levels of payment, benefi ts and labour conditions in all aspects. 
As a rule, the employers from these departments participate in the social dialogue (and 
in some cases in collective bargaining) on sector level, but they are not keen on strong 
sector collective agreement. Nevertheless, the clauses on salaries, social benefi ts, 
health and safety at work and others in CLA in MNC are signifi cantly better than those 
in the sector agreements. At the same time they are ready to oppose sector agreements 
because of separate clauses that they do not fully agree with – for longer leaves, for work 
5 The Labour Code contains a clause that gives the Minister of Labour and Social Policy the right to issue 
decisions for the distribution of collective labour agreements under specifi c conditions (they shall be 
signed by all sector organizations that belong to nationally representative trade unions’ and employers’ 
organizations on national level and there shall be a general request for distribution).
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hours, for employment, as well as in some cases for enhanced protection in case of lay-
offs of different categories, including trade unions’ and other workers’ representatives. 
In another group of departments of MNC, as well as in a series of other companies with 
foreign ownership, even if there are trade unions, they are usually weaker and either there 
are no collective bargaining cases or it is only the sector agreement that is recognized or a 
priority is given to the consultations for problem resolution. In a number of departments, 
mainly in the services, there are no trade unions or if there are attempts for establishing, 
there is a strong opposition from the employers for their “de facto” recognition („de iure” 
the trade unions do not need recognition pursuant to the Bulgarian legislation).
In the economic sector the most serious issue has to do with small companies and 
micro-fi rms, since most of them are not members of employers’ organizations, and 
most often their workers are not organized in trade unions. In most cases they are not 
covered by CLA and in practice hired workers can rely only on observing the LC. One 
of the outcomes of this situation puts both the workers from these enterprises in less 
favourable conditions and encourages unfair competition amongst businesses, is to be 
covered by the force of the sectoral/ branch CLA. It is clear though that this process, even 
though it has been launched, will be slow and diffi cult.
Some important trends
In 2009-2011, despite the crisis, there was an increase in the payment in a 
number of sectors, including machine building, metallurgy, chemical industry, 
water supply and sewage, trade, and some additional payments have been 
increased in these and other sectors. At the same time in a number of cases there 
have been compromises that had to be made by the trade unions and withdrawal 
from previous commitments, and the agreement was kept that they would be 
recovered “when there are fi nancial possibilities”. In the mining industry the 
average salary is by 77 % higher than the average salary in the production and 
4.4 times higher than the minimal salary for the country. In metallurgy and metal 
production salaries are annually indexed and automatically increased based on 
infl ation. In the chemical industry despite the forced decentralization, the actual 
lack of sector negotiations and the strong differentiation of the salaries in the 
sector (differences in average salaries, up to a ratio of 1:4), in 2010-2011 the 
salaries were increased at company level.
There is a very strong trend of decentralization in the negotiations for different 
types of additional remuneration, which are provided for in regulatory acts but 
they can vary by sector, company or labour conditions. In some cases this trend 
also concerns the negotiations for the minimum remunerations. In metallurgy, for 
example, employers do not want to agree at sector level even on minimum wages 
that correspond to the respective qualifi cation levels, as well as the minimum 
amount for further payment for work experience and professional experience, 
increased amount for extra labour, additional payment for working under risk 
labour conditions, as well as for drafting a list with similar professions for which 
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there is transferability and keeping of class qualifi cations. These conditions are 
usually agreed at company level.
The main argument of the employers for refusing to agree on minimum salaries are 
differences in the fi nancial and economic state of the companies, the different policies 
of building the payment and incentive systems. In addition, according to employers, each 
company must set the way to promote continuous work. The argument for the extra hours 
is that there is an entry in the LC and no increase of the amount is needed and as far 
as the further payment of the working conditions is concerned, their response is that 
there are investments and there shall be no such payment whatsoever. It is the general 
conviction among employers that the types and amount of additional remunerations 
which are regulated should decrease at the expense of the increase in income directly 
linked to production (basic salary and bonuses). 
Even though more rarely as compared to other countries, in Bulgaria there are 
derogations – deviations from the agreements in the sector collective labour 
contracts. There are also cases of deviations from the basic salary (for no more 
than three months), as well as in terms of reduction of bonuses or changes in 
the working hours. The main arguments which are present in the texts of sector 
and branch CLA, are – “serious diffi culties in the production and the market”, 
and in most cases employers are obliged to apply those deviations for no more 
than three months within 1 year or 6 months, even though there are records for 
longer periods too or the periods have not been fi xed at all. The salaries must be 
paid within three months with interests.
Such deviations are envisaged in some CLA in 2008-2010, when was the fi rst peak of the 
crisis. Those are cases in the timber and timber processing industry, paper and cellulose, 
machine building, some branches of the light industry, construction, retail. More often 
than not the deviations affect the amount of the gross salaries (construction, timber 
processing and furniture, paper, light industry). For metallurgy the minimal salary for 
the sector can be reduced in some companies in case of fi nancial problems but this 
is possible upon discussion and decision of the branch council for social partnership 
(where the social partners and the government are represented).
In the case of machine building, this affects bonuses, additional payments under 
LC, working hours. There are also some framework clauses affecting the additional 
remunerations and the extra paid leaves, but the details must be agreed on in the 
companies, with some deviations from the sectoral CLA. In addition there are agreements 
on the minimal level of resources for social, amenity and cultural service, but there is 
also a clause which allows for a reduction of this minimal level in the companies in cases 
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of fi nancial problems. For metallurgy the clauses on additional paid leaves even though 
agreed upon as such in the sector CLA are “open” and companies can diminish them. 
In retail there are additional remunerations agreed on at sectoral level but still derogations 
are possible in individual companies depending on the economic results.
Flexible/ fl oating systems of payment are not so popular in Bulgaria yet, 
especially in the public sector. Yet, they are already in use in the private sector – in 
industry, banks, insurance companies, as well as in the majority of the services, 
infrastructure and others. In most medium-sized industrial companies no overall 
systems are used, rather some elements, such as partial payment according to 
the work done and bonuses for the year. Some companies’ HR managers tend 
to increase the share of the fl oating part of the salary (i.e. bonuses, premiums, 
awards, fl oating additional remunerations, payable as per regulations, etc.) to the 
detriment of the basic salary and the “fi xed” part of the additional remunerations. 
In most departments of MNC and in some other big companies there are systems 
developed by the HR experts and applied in accordance with the internal rules. 
In companies with high density of trade unions these systems are agreed on or 
at least are consulted with trade unions. The collective negotiations, especially 
those in companies, are used for the application of fl exible systems of payment/ 
or more often – of separate elements (in some of the mines, in companies of the 
processing industry, from the infrastructure sectors, in commercial enterprises, 
in tourism, in some of the big banks where there are trade unions and in other 
services). At the same time, in a number of sectors, where there are no collective 
agreements or no trade unions / or they are of very low density (for example, in 
the IT sector, in business consultations, in real estate sector, in most banks and in 
insurance in general, as well as in most small and micro-enterprises) the fl exible 
systems or elements thereof are applied by the management teams unilaterally 
or in rare cases – upon consultations with other workers’ representatives, if 
there are such appointed (representatives pursuant to article 7, paragraph 2 of 
LC or pursuant to article 7а of LC).
Of special interest in this respect is the new system of fl exible payment in the public 
administration, which enters into force as of July 2012. There were serious objections 
against it by the trade unions and the NCTC could not reach a consensus on it. 
In conclusion, Bulgaria is not an exception from the general European trends of 
deregulation and decentralization of collective negotiations, with an infl uence on the 
mechanisms of salary calculation. By and large, the trends are relatively slower and 
changes take place with some diffi culties. The reasons for this are both the opposition 
by strong trade unions in some sectors, especially the heavy industry and some of the 
infrastructure sectors, as well as some reserves on the part of employers – due to 
reluctance to enter into confl icts, lack of obvious need to introduce new forms of payment 
and agreement, lack of well-developed regulatory base and others.
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The challenges of the crisis and new EU fi nancial instruments 
A serious challenge to the system of industrial relations, in particular to the development 
of social dialogue and the development of collective bargaining in the country, which can 
change the trends of its development, is the EU response to the crisis. The development 
of social dialogue and collective bargaining in Europe and in our country in particular, as 
the latest events show (trade unions’ protests against the unilateral decision for raising 
the retirement age, the strike in the Bulgarian railway state company, etc.), is under threat. 
The changed economic conditions place a number of obstacles to trade unions. The 
European pressure on the growth of salaries and the systems for salary formation, as 
well as against collective bargaining, comes as a result of the recommendations of the 
Economic governance and the Euro Plus Pact where the leitmotif is that salaries shall 
become the main instrument for control through improved fl exibility and freezing, which 
shall contribute to removing the imbalances and to raising the competitiveness. The crisis 
of the euro and the Eurozone serves as an excuse for avoiding and breaching collective 
agreements and even questions the validity of the national collective agreements thus 
undermining the autonomy of the collective bargaining. 6
The crisis was used to exert further pressure on the labour costs, as a result of which 
in many countries the salaries were frozen, and in some - even cut, in the public sector 
in particular, with which the governments clearly intervene in the collective agreements 
in force. Parallel to this, the crisis also encouraged the use of new forms of collective 
agreement at company level which give priority to retaining jobs to the detriment of 
payment, and in some countries there were even changes in the legislative framework 
of collective agreement, which allow for bigger deviations from the national or sectoral 
collective agreements. 
These are the consequences of the strict austerity policies in the whole of Europe, 
including the attacks against trade unions, against increasing of salaries, pensions and 
social services, against the trade unions’ right to collective bargaining. Bulgaria is an 
indicative example in this respect, especially in the last year. The poor fi nancial and 
economic state in a number of branches of the Bulgarian economy, the new economic 
management and new fi nancial instruments of Europe to which the current government 
is strongly attached, raise the question – to what extent the social partners on sectoral/ 
branch level and in individual companies are free to make agreements. The budget 
policy and the payment policy related to some limitations, restrictions and control are not 
favourable to the bargaining at these levels. This infl uences not only the public, but also 
the private sector in which bargaining faces further diffi culties by the scarce presence of 
trade unions.
The expected diffi cult recovery from the crisis in the years to come will obviously require 
the joint efforts and the greater commitment of both the government and the social 
partners for reaching a consensus through social dialogue. Collective bargaining can be 
one of the effi cient means in response to new challenges.
6 See publications on the Information site of CITUB under CLA
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3.4. Social Dialogue and Political Decisions for Reforming the Public Systems
As far as industrial relations and collective bargaining affect mainly the employed, their 
remunerations and labour conditions, important public systems and their reforming are 
subject to active social dialogue on national and/ or sectoral level, in view of their optimal 
functioning to the benefi t of all citizens. In the transition years, in different periods and 
with different frequency, processes were carried out of transforming, reforming and 
improving the pension, healthcare and education systems. As a rule, this used to happen 
with the participation of the social partners – trade unions and employers’ organizations. 
Even though the crisis affected these areas differently, after all they are experiencing the 
consequences of the restrictive policy, of the incomplete reforms or of undertaken urgent 
and painful recovery measures. 
Pension System
As most pension systems in the European countries, the Bulgarian pension system 
thoroughly changed in 2000, faced serious challenges mainly in terms of negative 
demographic changes. The main problem is the trend for long-term fi nancial instability 
of the state social security (SSS), which can generate future commitments of the state 
budget which are impossible. Great part of the fi nancial challenges to the system are a 
product of objective processes and previous political decisions in the fi eld of pension 
security which have resulted in: mismatch between revenue and expenditure pension 
policies; unjustifi ed high increase in the number of the disability pensions; the application 
of rules in favour of some groups of people with securities; the option for a very early 
retirement; and fi nally – limited possibilities of the pension system to play the role of an 
“automatic stabilizer” in the context of the crisis.
Under the pressure of necessities, the Consultative Council on the Pension Reform set up 
in 2010 with the participation of the social partners had the diffi cult task of retaining and 
improving the architecture of the pension model, fortifying the fi rst pillar, achieving an 
optimal balance between the three pillars of the pension system, removing all elements 
of social assistance from the security system, and strengthening the link between social 
security contribution and the pension amount. It was clear to everyone that there would 
be inevitable and unpopular decisions – raising the retirement age, increasing the 
required security experience and cutting security rights.
After intense negotiations, a lot of protests of the trade unions across the country and a 
general national protest in the capital city of the two trade union confederations (CITUB 
and CL “Podkrepa”), November 2010 saw the signing of National Agreement “New 
strategy for fi nancial stabilization of social security and improving the pension legislation” 
which resulted in a tripartite consensus for smooth phasing-in of the reform stages. The 
three most important stages included:
- As of 1 January 2012 an increase in the social security duration for workers of 
third category of labour by 4 months per year until they reach 37 years duration 
for women and 40 years for men in 2020.
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- As of 1 January 2015 early pensions for workers of fi rst and second category of 
labour will be paid only by the professional social funds; by then the conditions 
for retirement of the workers of different categories are kept.
- As of 1 January 2021 increase of the retirement age of women and men by 6 
months by the time it reaches 63 years for women (2026) and 65 years for men 
(2024).
In one year only this National Agreement was suspended by the government (not without 
external pressure) with the arguments of “deepening crisis” and “necessary urgent 
measures”. The new decision was – immediate and rapid (by 12 months) increase of the 
retirement age for all, which the trade unions strongly opposed, but in the end the fi nal 
draft of the reforms adopted in December 2011 was only “toned down” and it provides 
for the following:
- As of 1 January 2012 the retirement age shall increase by 4 months in the 
beginning of each calendar year by the time it becomes 65 years for men and 63 
years for women (the age until now was 63 and 60 years respectively).
- As of 1 January 2012 the experience needed for retirement shall increase by 4 
months per year by the year 2020 and for men it will become 40 years and for 
women 37 years (the required experience so far was 37 and 34 respectively).
- As of 1 January 2012 the pension age shall increase by 4 months a year for fi rst 
and second category of labour and in 2014 it shall become: for fi rst category – 
53 years for men and 48 years for women; for second category – 58 years for 
men and 53 years for women.
The NCTC shall discuss further changes related to the mechanism of updating the 
pensions, annual indexation and potential legislative changes, regulating the use 
of the fi nancial funds in the “Silver Fund”. The government’s intention to use part of 
them as investment instruments is accepted in different ways, both in the country and 
internationally.
Healthcare
The security-based healthcare system started its intensive restructuring in the middle 
of 1997, which resulted in the collection of social security contributions as of 1.7.1999, 
divided on a solidarity principle between the employer and the secured person so that 
fi nancial resources could be accumulated for the actual start of the reform a year later.
The model of reforming the healthcare system was unilaterally selected by the 
government. The social partners and the society had to take for granted a model of a 
healthcare system and the resulting changes in this sector on which no serious public 
debate had been held. The result from this is poor health of the population, no balance 
between the patients’ and the service providers’ interests, greater commercialization 
of healthcare to the detriment of its social functions, fi nancial instability of the system, 
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demotivation, alienation and tension amongst the professional communities, and 
corruption.
The social partners and the experts are unanimous that the healthcare system is the 
worst reformed public system, and moreover, bad decisions are made in different sectors 
of healthcare and prophylaxis, as well as in health security. Trade unions have good 
positions in collective bargaining, but far more limited infl uence on the healthcare reform. 
Despite the tripartite principle of managing the National Health Security Fund, there are no 
signifi cant positive changes as regards accomplishing greater transparency and effi ciency 
of fund spending or guaranteed access to healthcare of adequate quality and quantity. 
In 2009 the health security contribution was increased from 6 to 8%, but that did not have 
any signifi cant effect on the fi nancial security of the healthcare system. That is why it was 
quite right that within the negotiations on the austerity measures in 2010 the option for 
another increase of the health security contribution was dismissed. The following problems 
are all chronic in nature: hospital funding and defi cit forming in hospitals, control on the 
volume and quality of the medical services, regulated and non-regulated payments by 
patients, clear identifi cation of the non-secured persons and their inclusion in the system.
Public funds for healthcare are not enough, they are used in conditions of ineffi cient 
control, of many organizational and management problems. The most important functions 
of the state as regards the healthcare policy – the estimation of healthcare needs of 
the population, the strategic planning of healthcare resources and the regulation of 
agreements with hospitals using public resources results only in statements and in 
publishing demographic and medical statistics and economic data on the current state 
of the healthcare system.
The system for voluntary collection of public resources for payment of healthcare activity 
is extremely ineffi cient and relies mainly on corporate clients, and not on individually 
insured persons in the case of free selection of fund. Payments from the voluntary funds 
duplicate the payments from the NHSF. What is needed for this purpose is adopting 
a basic (optimal) package of obligatory health security at 100% guaranteed funding 
from the NHSF, while voluntary health security companies shall provide additional 
(superstructural) package. 
Obviously the creation and presentation of a clear and complete vision for the development 
of the healthcare sector and for the health security system in Bulgaria should be done 
and this vision must be based on respecting the opinion of social partners, the interests 
of society in general, rather than of individual professional communities as frequent 
practices so far have been. 
Education
Following the most massive and continuous strike of teachers of the autumn of 2007, 
in 2008 there was a reform in the secondary education system through the introduction 
delegated budgets. The distribution of funds for individual schools is performed according 
to unifi ed expenditure standards and according to the number of children and students 
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in them. This practice continued in 2009 too. As a result of the reform more than 5, 000 
teachers were laid off and a number of schools were closed down – mainly in villages 
that could not provide the required number of students. This negative social effect, 
consumed in advance, to a large extent preserved the sustainability of the education 
system later in the crisis.
The streamlining of the secondary education system allowed for a fairer and more 
effi cient spending of funds, on the one hand, and on the other – made possible the 
application of additional stimulating mechanisms for teachers with higher qualifi cation 
and workload. School principals were given greater freedom in the distribution of funds 
within the delegated budgets, as well as the option to attract additional funds by applying 
and participating in external projects.
At the same time however the budget for secondary education in 2009 resulted in a 10% 
reduction of the universal expenditure standards for funding a child/ student. These 
amounts were preserved in the course of time which meant that in practice the salaries 
in secondary education were frozen and the opportunities for improving the school 
environment were postponed.
The main problem before secondary education is still the drop-outs. Their number was 
gradually reduced from 22% in 2003 to 13.9% in 2010 and this comes as a result 
mainly of two types of policies – forceful and stimulating. The fi rst one is fi xed by the 
adopted rule – child benefi ts shall be paid to parents only if their children go regularly to 
school, and the second is refl ected in the free-of-charge textbooks until 7th grade, free-
of-charge breakfast, organized transportation, full-time education for fi rst- and second-
graders whose mother tongue is different from Bulgarian. In the end however the effect 
is considered to be unsatisfactory. Early drop-out from school is one of the biggest 
challenges before the labour market now and in the future when an acute defi cit of 
quality labour force  is to be expected.
In the fi eld of vocational training progress has been made in terms of implementing the idea 
of voucher training. Upon a decision of the Monitoring Committee of Operational Programme 
“HR Development” a system of vouchers was introduced for the training of unemployed 
and employed which accelerated the absorption of the programme funds. The committee 
approved the allocation of BGN 100 million for funding projects for extracurricular activities, 
BGN 30 million for the development of distance training in higher education and BGN 8 
million for practice in real working environment for students from secondary schools.
However, the involvement of the business in vocational training is considered insuffi cient. 
On the one hand, there is no link between employers and schools which is a prerequisite for 
mismatch between demanded and supplied skills and knowledge, for the lack of opportunities 
for production practices and internships. On the other – most companies (mainly medium 
and small ones) do not pay much attention to maintaining the qualifi cation of their workers 
and consider the expenses for courses and trainings as a fi nancial burden for the company’s 
fi nance. In this sense one should not rely only on the state, besides the state is not fl exible 
enough to react to the dynamically changing conditions.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This report describes the system of industrial relations in the country and the infl uence 
of the crisis on the development of social dialogue and collective bargaining at different 
levels. 
The development of the Bulgarian system of industrial relations and the activity of 
the main social actors are infl uenced to a large extent by the effects of transition to 
market economy and the accession to the EU. One of the irrefutable achievements of 
the democratic development in the country is the transition from centralized labour 
relations defi ned and set by the state only to a model of industrial relations based on 
social dialogue and establishing the institutions to perform it. 
The global recession has hit the economic growth of the country quite hard. In Bulgaria 
as in many other countries around the world the economic crisis resulted in a dramatic 
drop in domestic demand and investments that had been key drivers of growth before 
the crisis.In line with the measures for economies of the government, salaries and social 
payments were frozen against the background of rising prices.
Besides, the worsened labour market conditions since the beginning of the recession are 
among the heaviest in the EU-27. After fi ve years (2004-2008) in which labour market 
indicators improved considerably, Bulgaria lost more than 20% jobs during the recession. 
As a result of this the employment rate dropped, and the unemployment rate (long-term 
unemployment included) more than doubled. Considerable pressure was exerted on the 
pension, healthcare and education systems.
The crisis and the strict austerity policy are seriously affecting the system of industrial 
relations both in terms of environment which results in a new balance of power distribution 
and in terms of the actors’ roles and behaviour within it. 
The analysis of the content and what was achieved in the collective agreements at 
different levels in the context of the crisis allows for several general conclusions to be 
drawn:
 In the context of stagnation of production and limited fi nancial opportunities the 
majority of companies have considerably fewer options for bargaining and that 
results in a number of compromises in terms of the content of the CLA at sectoral 
level and in companies;
 The social partners, after diffi cult negotiations in some sectors and in the context of 
crisis, manage to stick to basic agreements and parameters from the previous cycle 
of agreement;
  In some sectors there are agreements for austerity packages in the fi eld of employment, 
working schedules and working hours, qualifi cation and retraining of staff;
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 Even though rarely, in individual sectors/ branches there are agreements for higher 
and more favourable parameters under some of the clauses of the collective 
agreement, payment included;
 In a number of sectors, to compensate for the lack of increase of salaries, there 
are agreements for more favourable parameters under other indicators (training, 
holidays and leaves, etc.), i.e. the so called “trade-off” effect.
In addition, despite the crisis the Minister of labour and social policy for the fi rst time 
made use of the right to distributing sector/branch collective agreements. 
Parallel to this, a number of employers’ organizations and employers are getting keener 
to have collective agreements in companies.  
The practice of some European countries is still insuffi ciently used in the economic 
decline, for signing agreements in individual domains rather than complete rejection of 
collective bargaining. Neither are the so called open clauses made full use of which allow 
for making agreements that match the different state of the companies in a sector or a 
branch and this deprives CLA at sectoral level from the necessary fl exibility. 
What is also needed is taking greater advantage of the European practice for binding 
payment to productivity and infl ation. In addition, collective agreements should not only 
allow hired workers to contribute to the profi t, but also to have proportionate participation 
in its distribution by agreeing on different schemes for fi nancial participation, especially 
having in mind some recent regulations in this respect. 
The social dialogue had an important role in undertaking measures as a response to the 
crisis, at least at the initial stages – agreeing on reduced working hours and austerity 
packages, etc. A lot of those measures have not been implemented, and the government 
unilaterally changed the agreements accomplished, and signed with the social partners. 
The challenges in terms of recovery from the crisis require as regards the functioning of 
the system of industrial relations that:
- The governments and the social partners shall give priority to the agreed 
measures in response to the crisis and to constant monitoring of their 
implementation;
- Shared responsibility and commitment of the government and the social 
partners in the process of collective bargaining at all levels;
- The social dialogue and the collective agreement shall be considered a recovery 
instrument for economic growth and employment;
- Smooth transition from priority retention of jobs to the creation of sustainable 
and quality employment during the recovery period;
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- Increasing investments in human capital with shared responsibility between 
the state, the employers and the local communities;
- Undertaking urgent measures and targeted policies to the most vulnerable 
and the most affected by the crisis social layers;
- The application of minimal social standards in a wide range of fi elds of 
increasingly pan-European dimensions.
Based on the need to reach public consensus on these key directions for action of 
our country, the CITUB has already proposed that a National Board for Sustainable 
Development be set up – similar to the Committees with similar activities that exist in 
many countries. This initiative is in full harmony with the best European practices and 
the Europe 2020 Strategy and will support not only the development of the national 
economy in the period of recovery from the economic and fi nancial crisis, but will also 
contribute to the development of the national vision for the state policies in a long-term 
perspective in view of the country’s commitments in the fi eld of sustainable development 
and the environment.
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